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This paper studies whether compliance with the Basel 
Core Principles for effective banking supervision is 
associated with bank soundness. Using data for more 
than 3,000 banks in 86 countries, the authors find that 
neither the overall index of compliance with the Basel 
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Core Principles nor the individual components of the 
index are robustly associated with bank risk measured 
by Z-scores. The results of the analysis cast doubt on the 
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represent.  I.   INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis has sparked widespread calls for reforms of regulation and 
supervision. The initial reaction to the crisis was one of disbelief: How could such extensive 
financial distress emerge in countries where the supervision of financial risk had been thought to 
be the best in the world?  Indeed, the regulatory standards and protocols of the advanced 
countries at the center of the financial storm were being emulated worldwide through the 
progressive adoption of the international Basel capital standards and the Basel Core Principles 
for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs). 
The crisis exposed significant weaknesses in the financial system’s regulatory and 
supervisory framework worldwide, and has spawned a growing debate about the role these 
weaknesses may have played in causing and propagating the crisis. As a result, reform of 
regulation and supervision is a top priority for policymakers, and many countries are working to 
upgrade their frameworks. But what should the reforms focus on? What constitutes good 
regulation and supervision? Which elements are most important for ensuring bank soundness? 
What should be the scope of regulation? 
To date, the best practices in supervision and regulation have been embodied by the 
BCPs (Table 1). These principles were issued in 1997 by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision, comprising representatives from bank supervisory agencies from advanced 
countries.
2 Since then, most countries in the world have stated their intent to adopt and comply 
with the BCPs, making them a global standard for bank regulators. Importantly, since 1999, the 
IMF and the World Bank have conducted evaluations of countries’ compliance with these 
principles, mainly within their joint Financial Sector Assessment program (FSAP).
3 The 
assessments are conducted according to a standardized methodology developed by the Basel 
Committee and therefore provide a unique source of information about the quality of supervision 
                                                 
2  The Basel committee, initially made up of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, now also includes Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa and Turkey. The committee consults with supervisors from non-member countries. 
3  FSAPs are a comprehensive evaluation of the stability and development of a country’s financial sector and include 
assessments of compliance with various standards and codes. Many FSAPs are publicly available on the IMF and 
World Bank websites.    - 3 - 
and regulation around the world. Hence the international community has made significant 
investments in developing these principles, encouraging their wide-spread adoption, and 
assessing progress with their compliance.   
In light of the recent crisis and the resulting skepticism about the effectiveness of existing 
approaches to regulation and supervision, it is natural to ask if compliance with the global 
standard of good regulation is associated with bank soundness. This is the subject of this paper. 
Specifically, we test whether better compliance with BCPs is associated with safer banks. We 
also look at whether compliance with different elements of the BCP framework is more closely 
associated with bank soundness to identify if there are specific areas which would help prioritize 
reform efforts to improve supervision. 
The paper extends our previous work (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008: 
henceforth DDT), in which we showed that banks receive more favorable financial strength 
ratings from Moody’s in countries with better compliance with BCPs related to information 
provision, while compliance with other principles does not affect ratings significantly. The 
policy message from this study was that countries should give priority to strengthening 
regulation and regulation in the area of information provision (both to the market and to 
supervisors) relative to other areas covered by the core principles. Using rating information to 
proxy bank risk significantly limited the sample size in that study, making it necessary to exclude 
many smaller banks and many banks from lower income countries. Furthermore, after the recent 
crisis, the credibility of credit ratings as indicators of bank risk has also diminished, questioning 
the merit of using these ratings in the analysis.
4  
In this paper, we explore whether BCP compliance affects bank soundness, but instead of 
using ratings we capture bank soundness using the Z-score, which is the number of standard 
deviations by which bank returns have to fall to wipe out bank equity (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). 
Because we can construct Z-scores using just accounting information, and because assessment 
data for additional countries have also become available, we can extend the sample size 
considerably relative to our earlier study, to over 3,000 banks from 86 countries (compared to 
                                                 
4 Most of the criticism of rating agencies has focused on ratings of structured products. Nonetheless, bank ratings 
certainly did not foresee the impending financial meltdown.   - 4 - 
200 banks from 37 countries analyzed in DDT). This is not just a simple increase in sample size: 
the sample of rated banks was not a representative sample, since rated banks tend to be larger, 
more internationally active, and more likely to adhere to international accounting standards. 
From a policy point of view, we would like to investigate the effect on all types of banks 
operating in different country circumstances, rather than a select subgroup. In this study, the 
richer sample allows us to explore whether the relationship between BCPs and bank soundness 
varies across different types of banks. 
All in all, we do not find support for the hypothesis that better compliance with BCPs 
results in sounder banks as measured by Z-scores. This result holds after controlling for the 
macroeconomic environment, institutional quality, and bank characteristics. We also fail to find 
a significant relationship when we consider different samples, such a sample of rated banks only, 
a sample including only commercial banks, and samples including only the largest financial 
institutions. In an additional test, we calculate aggregate Z-scores at the country level to try to 
capture the stability of the system as a while rather than that of individual banks, but also this 
measure of soundness is not significantly related to overall BCP compliance.  
When we explore the relationship between soundness and compliance with specific 
groups of principles, which refer to separate areas of prudential supervision and regulation, we 
continue to find no evidence that good compliance is related to improved soundness. If anything, 
we find that stronger compliance with principles related to the power of supervisors to license 
banks and regulate market structure are associated with riskier banks.  
While these results cast doubts on whether international efforts to improve financial 
regulation and supervision should continue to place a strong emphasis on BCPs, a number of 
caveats are in order. First, insignificant results may simply indicate that accounting-based 
measures, such as Z-scores, do not adequately capture bank soundness, especially for small 
banks and in low income countries, where accounting standards tend to be poor. The lack of 
significant results may also be attributable to low quality of the assessments of BCP compliance, 
especially in low income countries where implementation may be difficult to judge accurately,   - 5 - 
and laws and regulations on the books may carry little weight.
5 It might be also argued that 
assessments are not comparable across countries, despite the best efforts of expert supervisors 
and internal reviewing teams at the IMF and the World Bank to ensure a uniform methodology 
and uniform standards. If our negative results arise because compliance assessments do not 
reflect reality or are not comparable across countries, then – at a minimum – they should lead us 
to question the value of these assessments in ensuring that countries’ supervision measures up to 
global standards.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section contains a review of related 
literature. Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 4 contains the results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining good regulatory and supervisory practices is a difficult and complicated task. Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004, 2006) were the first to compile and analyze an extensive 
database on banking sector laws and regulations using various surveys of regulators around the 
world, and to study the relationship between alternative regulatory strategies and outcomes. This 
research finds that regulatory approaches that facilitate private sector monitoring of banks (such 
as disclosure of reliable, comprehensive and timely information) and strengthen incentives for 
greater market monitoring (for example by limiting deposit insurance) improve bank 
performance and stability. In contrast, boosting official supervisory oversight and disciplinary 
powers and tightening capital standards does not lead to banking sector development, nor does it 
improve bank efficiency, reduce corruption in lending, or lower banking system fragility.
6 They 
interpret their findings as a challenge to the Basel Committee’s influential approach to bank 
regulation which heavily emphasizes capital and official supervision.   
                                                 
5 Measurement error, if random, would not bias coefficients, but would increase standard errors, thereby resulting in 
in insignificant results. 
6 Laeven and Levine (2008) extend this analysis to show that the impact of regulations on bank risk taking also 
varies with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank.   - 6 - 
An important limitation of this type of survey is that it mainly captures rules and 
regulations that are on the books rather than actual implementation. IMF and the World Bank 
financial sector assessments have often found implementation to be lacking, particularly in low-
income countries, so that cross-country comparisons of what is on the books may hide 
substantial variation in the quality of supervision and regulation. BCP assessments have the 
advantage of taking into account implementation. Of course, assessing how rules and regulations 
are implemented and enforced in practice is not an exact science, and individual assessments 
may be influenced by factors such as the assessors’ experience and the regulatory culture they 
are most familiar with. Nevertheless, although it is difficult to eliminate subjectivity completely, 
assessments are based on a standardized methodology and are carried out by experienced 
international assessors with broad country experience.  
Cihak and Tieman (2008) analyze the quality of financial sector regulation and 
supervision using both Barth, Caprio and Levine’s survey data and BCP assessments. They find 
that regulation and supervision in high-income countries is generally of higher quality than in 
lower-income countries. They also note that the correlation between survey data and BCP data 
tend to be low, always less than 50 percent and in many cases in the 20-30 percent range, 
suggesting that taking into account implementation may indeed make an important difference.   
A number of papers also use BCP assessments to study bank regulation and performance.  
Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001) use a sample of 25 countries to examine the relationship 
between an overall index of BCP compliance and two indicators of bank soundness: non-
performing loans (NPLs) and loan spreads. They find BCP compliance not to be a significant 
determinant of these measures of soundness. Podpiera (2004) extends the set of countries and 
finds that better BCP compliance lowers NPLs. Das et al. (2005) relates bank soundness to a 
broader concept of regulatory governance, which encompasses compliance with the BCPs as 
well as compliance with standards and codes for monetary and financial policies. Better 
regulatory governance is found to be associated with sounder banks, particularly in countries 
with better institutions.   
In this paper, as already discussed we rely on the Z-score to measure bank soundness. 
While the Z-score has its limitations, we believe it is an improvement over measures used in   - 7 - 
previous studies, namely NPLs, loan spreads, interest margins, and capital adequacy. Because 
different countries have different reporting rules, NPLs are notoriously difficult to compare 
across countries. On the other hand, loan spreads or interest margins and capitalization are 
affected by a variety of forces other than fragility, such as market structure, differences in risk-
free interest rates and operating costs, and varying capital regulation. Thus, cross-country 
comparability is a serious issue. In contrast with ratings, Z-scores do not rely on the subjective 
judgment of rating agencies’ analysts. 
III.   METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The dependent variable is the bank’s financial soundness as measured by its Z-score, and the 
explanatory variable of interest is the country’s BCP compliance score. The latter is available 
only at one point in time, so the sample is a cross-sectional one. The regression equations we 







1 ij j ij j ij X X X Z            (1) 
where the subscript j denotes the country and the subscript i denotes the bank. ij Z is the Z-score 
for bank i in country j, 
1
j X is the BCP compliance score in country j,
2
ij X is a vector of bank 
characteristics, 
3
j X  is a vector of country characteristics, and ij  is a random disturbance. The 
RHS variables are five-year averages over the period [t, t-4], where t is the year of the BCP 
compliance evaluation, which varies within the time period 1999-2006 depending on the 
country.
7  
The Z-score is defined as (average return on assets +equity/assets)/(standard deviation of 
the return on assets) over [t, t-4]. It can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations by 
which returns would have to fall from the mean to wipe out all equity in the bank (Boyd and 
Runkle, 1993). In the regressions, we actually use as the dependent variable ln(1+ Z-score) 
to smooth out higher values of the Z-score and avoid truncating the dependent variable at zero. 
In an alternative specification we also calculate Z-scores at the country level as opposed to the 
                                                 
7 For some banks the variables are averaged over a shorter time period because of missing data.    - 8 - 
individual bank level to capture systemic as opposed to individual bank risk (see section IV 
below for more details). Equation (1) is estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by 
country to allow for correlated residuals within each country.  
The variable of interest is 
1
j X , the BCP compliance score. The data come from IMF and 
the World Bank BCP assessments conducted from 1999 to 2006.
8 Assessors rate compliance 
with each of the 25 Basel Core Principles using a four-point scale: non compliant, materially non 
compliant, largely compliant, and compliant. We assign numerical values to each of these ratings 
from 0 (non-compliant) to 3 (compliant). To obtain an overall index of compliance, we sum the 
numerical ratings for all the principles, and standardize the sum to obtain an index that varies 
between zero and one. To differentiate among the various dimensions of regulation and 
supervision, we also compute aggregate compliance indexes for each of the subgroups of 
principles following the grouping by chapters used by the Basel Committee (See Table 1). Also 
in this case, we sum the numerical ratings for each principle in the Chapter and average the 
value. Compliance for each chapter is used as an alternative variable of interest.  
The first set of control variables includes various bank characteristics that might affect 
financial strength: size, measured by the logarithm of bank assets; cost efficiency, measured as 
overhead costs as a ratio of total assets; and illiquidity proxied by the ratio of bank loans to total 
assets. We also control for whether the bank is a commercial bank or not (see below for sample 
composition). Bank data come from Fitch’s Bankscope database.
9 
A second group of control variables captures the overall quality of the institutions in the 
country. Combining information from a variety of available indexes, Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2003) create various broad measures of perception of institutional quality which have 
been widely used in empirical studies. In our baseline specification, we use an index capturing 
the extent to which the rule of law is respected. This index is strongly correlated with other 
                                                 
8 Some assessments are publicly available through the IMF and World Bank websites. A number of them, however, 
are kept confidential by the country’s authorities. 
9 Summary statistics and cross-correlations for the variables used in the analysis are in the Appendix. A small 
number of observations with negative equity, negative overheads, overhead to assets ratios greater than one and 
negative net loans/assets were excluded.   - 9 - 
institutional indexes from the same source, such as lack of corruption, contract enforcement, etc., 
and we obtain similar results using these alternative indexes, an average of the indexes, or GDP 
per capita.  
Bank soundness is also affected by the macroeconomic outlook, as slow output growth, 
high and volatile inflation, rapid exchange rate depreciation, high real interest rates, and rapid 
credit expansion have been found to be associated with bank instability (see, for instance, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Thus, in robustness tests we employ various 
combinations of these macroeconomic variables in alternative specifications. We also use S&P’s 
sovereign rating as a comprehensive indicator of the quality of macroeconomic policies and 
institutions which might affect bank stability in a country. Macroeconomic variables are mainly 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
The sample covers 86 countries and over 3,000 banks, including commercial banks, 
cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and savings banks (Table A1). We also work 
with different subsamples of banks; from smallest to largest, these are: rated banks (those with a 
Moody’s rating), commercial banks, and all financial institutions, including investment 
banks/security houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, 
specialized government credit institutions.  
Since countries in the sample have economies and banking systems of vastly different 
size, the sample is very unbalanced, with some countries represented by only a handful of banks, 
and others with hundreds. In particular, Japanese banks account for 23.4 percent of this sample 
(721 banks). To ensure that regression results are not overly influenced by Japan, we examine 
results both with and without Japanese banks. Finally, we also estimate specifications including 
only the top 10 banks in each country and the top 20 percent of banks in the sample, to explore 
whether the relationship between bank soundness and compliance may differ for the largest 
banks.
 10     
                                                 
10 For more details on the various subsambles, see Table A6.   - 10 - 
IV.   THE RESULTS 
Results from the baseline regression, relating bank soundness measured by the Z-score to the 
degree of compliance with the BCPs are in Table 2. In the sample including all countries, the Z-
score is higher, indicating a sounder bank, for banks with lower operating costs in countries with 
higher GDP per capita. Also, non-commercial banks tend to have higher Z-scores, while the 
other control variables are not significant. The coefficient of the BCP compliance index is 
positive but not significant.  
If we exclude Japanese banks, which account for over 20 percent of the sample, the fit of 
the model improves markedly (the R-squared increases from 10 percent to 19 percent) and the 
coefficients of many regressors change substantially.
11 This suggests that the variables explaining 
the Z-score of Japanese banks may be somewhat different than for the rest of the sample, perhaps 
because of the lingering effects of Japan’s prolonged banking crisis on bank balance sheets. For 
example, in the sample excluding Japan inflation and the rule of law index are significant (with 
the expected coefficients), while GDP per capita is not (though the coefficient remains positive). 
Also, banks with a higher ratio of net loans to assets have higher Z-scores, perhaps because Basel 
regulation mandating minimum levels of risk-adjustment capital forces these banks to hold more 
equity. Also, in the sample excluding Japan larger banks have lower Z-score, likely because they 
tend to hold less capital than smaller banks.   
More interestingly, in the sample without Japan the coefficient of the BCP compliance 
index is negative, even though it remains insignificant. If we add to the regression additional 
macro controls, such as exchange rate appreciation, private credit, or the sovereign rating, the 
coefficient remains negative and increases in magnitude, but remains statistically insignificant. 
To summarize, we find no systematic effect of BCP compliance on bank soundness measured by 
the Z-score in the baseline sample.  
In the regressions reported in Table 3 we explore how the relationship between BCP 
compliance and bank soundness changes if we alter the sample composition to include various 
categories of financial institutions to explore whether BCP compliance may affect soundness for 
                                                 
11 Excluding other countries does not result in large changes in regression results.   - 11 - 
alternative types of banks. All these results refer to the sample excluding Japan, so that the 
overrepresentation of Japanese banks does not distort the results. Baseline results are reported in 
the first column to facilitate comparison.  
The first exercise is to examine the widest sample possible, i.e. one that includes 
investment banks/securities houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit 
institutions, and specialized government credit institutions. These are institutions that in most 
countries are unlikely to fall under the perimeter of bank regulation and supervision, so we have 
excluded them from the baseline sample. When we include them, the sample size grows by 25 
percent, but the main regression results are unchanged. In particular, bank soundness is not 
significantly affected by compliance with the BCPs.  
If we restrict the sample to commercial banks only, thereby losing about 300 banks 
compared to the baseline sample, once again we find that regression results remain very close to 
the baseline. When we focus only on banks rated by Moody’s, as in our earlier work, the sample 
shrinks considerably (to just over 300 banks), and the coefficient of the BCP compliance index 
becomes positive and significant, albeit only at the 10 percent confidence level. Thus, BCP 
compliance seems to have some positive effect on the soundness of this specific group of banks. 
To explore this issue further, we ask whether this result is driven by the fact that rated banks are 
larger banks. To do so, we consider two alternative samples: the first includes the largest 10 
percent of banks within each country and the second includes the largest 20 percent of banks in 
the entire sample. Interestingly, when we consider the largest banks within each country, the 
BCP compliance index has a negative and insignificant coefficient as in the baseline sample. On 
the other hand, when we take the top 20 percent banks in the sample the results look closer to 
those for rated banks, with the BCP coefficient positive, although not statistically significant. 
Thus, there is some evidence that BCP compliance may have some positive effects on soundness 
for larger, rated banks.  
The BCP compliance index is the weighted sum of compliance scores for several 
individual chapters of the Core Principles. Could it be that, even though overall compliance does 
not seem to matter for bank soundness, some aspects of the Core Principles might be relevant? In 
fact, it may be possible that the overall index is not significant because of offsetting effects of its   - 12 - 
different components. In fact, in our previous study of Moody’s ratings, we found that, although 
overall compliance did not seem to matter, higher financial strength ratings were associated with 
better compliance with principles related to information provision to supervisors.  
We address this question by re-running the baseline regressions breaking down the 
compliance index into seven components, based on the standard grouping of principles used by 
the Basel Committee (Table 1). An important caveat is that compliance scores are fairly strongly 
correlated (see Appendix Table A5), which may make it difficult to disentangle the effect of one 
set of principles from the others. We replicate the regression for different samples of banks to 
investigate the robustness of the results. The results are in Table 4. There is only one component 
of the compliance index that has a fairly robust relationship with bank Z-scores, and that is 
compliance with Chapter 2 of the BCP, i.e. principles having to do with supervisors’ powers to 
regulate bank licensing and structure. Interestingly, this component of the index is negatively 
correlated with bank soundness, so that banks in countries were regulators have better defined 
powers to give out licenses and regulate bank activities tend to be riskier. This result holds in all 
the samples except those including only the largest banks.
12 This finding supports the contention 
that supervisory systems that tend to empower supervisors do not work well (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 2001, 2004, 2006).
13  
So far, we have considered individual bank risk. In principle, bank supervision and 
regulation should be primarily concerned with systemic risk, rather than individual bank risk, 
although in practice it is not always easy to make this distinction. Could it be that BCP 
compliance, while not relevant to individual bank soundness, is important to ensure the stability 
of system as a whole? To address this question, it would be ideal to test whether BCP 
compliance reduces the probability of a financial crisis. However, since crises are rare events, 
this type of test requires a panel of data; since we have BCP compliance assessments only at a 
point in time, we are restricted to cross-sectional data. Nonetheless, to explore this question we 
                                                 
12 Results are robust to introducing compliance to each subcomponent separately in the regression. 
13 We also find that compliance with Chapter 5, information disclosure, has a positive and significant coefficient, but 
only in the sample including Japan. In contrast, in DDT we found that compliance with information disclosure was a 
significant determinant of Moody’s financial strength rating, and that this result was robust to dropping any 
individual country from the sample.     - 13 - 
compute a rough measure of systemic soundness as the aggregate equivalent of the individual 
bank Z-score. More specifically, we aggregate profits and equity of all the banks in the country 
(for which we have data), we compute the standard deviation of aggregate profits, and then we 
compute an aggregate Z-score. This measure tells us by how many standard deviations banking 
system profits must fall to exhaust all the capital in the banking system. We then regress this 
measure on the BCP compliance score and a number of macroeconomic control variables.  
The results are in Table 5. Our measure of systemic soundness is correlated with the 
macro variables as one might expect: higher growth, low inflation, low inflation volatility, 
appreciation of the currency, favorable sovereign ratings are all significantly associated with 
higher values of the aggregate Z-score. Once again, though, the BCP compliance index does not 
seem to be a significant determinant of banking system soundness. Though it is positive, the 
coefficient of the BCP index is small and not statistically significant in any specification. 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
While the causes and consequences of the recent financial crisis will continue to be debated for 
years to come, there is emerging consensus that the crisis has revealed significant weaknesses in 
the regulatory and supervisory system. Resulting calls for reform have led to numerous proposals 
and policymakers in many countries are hard at work to upgrade their regulatory frameworks.
14 
This paper seeks to inform the on-going reform process by providing an analysis of how existing 
regulations and their application are associated with bank soundness. Specifically, we study 
whether compliance with Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision (BCPs) is 
associated with lower bank risk, as measured by Z-scores.  
We find no evidence of a robust statistical relationship linking better compliance with 
BCPs and improved bank soundness. Analyzing aggregate Z-scores to capture systemic stability 
issues yields similarly insignificant results.  If anything, we find that compliance with a specific 
group of principles, those giving supervisors powers to regulate bank licensing and structure, is 
                                                 
14  See for example Acharya and Richardson (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009),  Caprio et al. (2009), Financial 
Services Authority (2009),  Demirgüç-Kunt and Serven (2009), Financial Stability Forum (2008), G-20 (2009), 
Goodhart, (2008a,b), Goodhart and Persuad (2008), Kashyap et al. (2008), U.S. Treasury (2009) and proposals by 
the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, which can be found on the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
website.   - 14 - 
associated with riskier banks, potentially suggesting that such powers may be misused in 
practice.  
While our results may reflect the difficulty of capturing bank risk using accounting 
measures, or the inability of assessors to carry out evaluations that are comparable across 
countries, nevertheless they raise questions about the relevance of the Basel Core Principles, the 
current emphasis on these principles as key to effective supervision, and the wisdom of carrying 
out costly periodic compliance reviews of BCP implementation in the IMF/World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs.    - 15 - 
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Table 1.  Basel Core Principles—Definitions 
Chapter 1: Preconditions for effective banking supervision 
Principle 1. Objectives, autonomy, powers, and resources  
Principle 1(1). There should be clear responsibilities and objectives set by legislations for each supervisory agency 
Principle 1(2). Each supervisory agency should possess adequate resources to meet the objective set,  
provided on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, integrity and independence of supervisory agency  
Principle 1(3). A suitable framework of banking laws, setting bank minimum standard, including provisions related 
to authorization of banking establishments and their supervision  
Principle 1(4). The legal framework should provide power to address compliance with laws as well as safety and 
soundness concerns 
Principle 1(5). The legal framework should provide protection of supervisors for actions taken in good faith in the 
course of  performing supervisory duties 
Principle 1(6). There should be arrangements of interagency cooperation, including with foreign supervisors, for 
sharing information and protecting the confidentiality of such information 
 
Chapter 2: Licensing and Structure 
Principle 2. Definition of permissible activities 
Principle 3. Right to set licensing criteria and reject applications for establishments that do meet the standard sets. 
Principle 4. Authority to review and reject proposals of significant ownership changes. 
Principle 5. Authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments 
 
Chapter 3: Prudential Regulations and Requirements 
Principle 6. Prudent and appropriate risk adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set 
Principle 7. Supervisors should evaluate banks' credit policies 
Principle 8. Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and loan-loss provisioning policies 
Principle 9. Supervisors should set limits to restrict large exposures, and concentration in bank portfolios should be 
identifiable  
Principle 10. Supervisors must have in place requirements to mitigate the risks associated with related lending 
Principle 11. Policies must be in place to identify, monitor and control country risks, and to maintain reserves 
against such risks  
Principle 12. Systems must be in place to accurately measure, monitor and adequately control markets risks and 
supervisors should have powers to impose limits or capital charge on such exposures 
Principle 13. Banks must have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and 
control all other material risks and, if needed, hold capital against such risks 
Principle 14. Banks should have internal control and audit systems in place. 
Principle 15. Adequate policies, practices and procedures should be in place to promote high ethical and 
professional standards and prevent the bank being used by criminal elements 
 
Chapter 4: Methods of On-Going Supervision 
Principle 16. An effective supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision 
Principle 17. Supervisors should have regular contact with bank management 
Principle 18. Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports and statistics 
returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis 
Principle 19. Supervisors must have a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through 
on-site examinations or use of external auditors 
Principle 20. Supervisors must have the ability to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis 
 
Chapter 5: Information Requirements 
Principle 21. Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of 
the financial condition of the bank of the bank, and must publish on a regular basis financial statements that fairly 
reflect its condition 
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Chapter 6: Formal Powers of Supervisors 
Principle 22. Adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about corrective action when banks fail to 
meet prudential requirement when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are threatened in any other 
way. This should include the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation. 
 
Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking 
Principle 23. Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over internationally active banks, adequately 
monitor and apply prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banks. 
Principle 24. Consolidated supervision should include establishing contact and information exchange with the 
various supervisors involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities 
Principle 25. Supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted at the same standards  
as required of domestic institutions, and must have powers to share information needed by the home country 
supervisors of those banks 
 
Source: Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel, 
September 1997. 
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Table 2. BCP Compliance and Bank Z-Scores: Baseline Results   
        
 
all 
countries excluding  Japan  excluding Japan  excluding Japan 
excluding 
Japan 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
        
BCP overall compliance  0.310  -0.188  -0.155  -0.217  -0.389 
 (0.490)  (0.332)  (0.333)  (0.342)  (0.387) 
Non-commercial bank  0.287***  0.529***  0.529***  0.532***  0.457*** 
 (0.088)  (0.122)  (0.120)  (0.122)  (0.163) 
Rated banks  0.071  0.148  0.171  0.154  0.175 
 (0.127)  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.110)  (0.108) 
Net loans/total assets  0.003  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005*** 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Total assets  -0.043  -0.060** -0.067*** -0.063**  -0.066** 
 (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Overheads/total assets  -2.978***  -3.625*** -3.631*** -3.590***  -2.648*** 
 (0.753)  (0.740)  (0.763)  (0.738)  (0.873) 
Index of rule of law  0.107  0.201***  0.179**  0.106  -0.149 
 (0.092)  (0.066)  (0.072)  (0.102)  (0.181) 
GDP growth  7.512**  1.595  1.315  2.418  4.475 
 (3.673)  (3.041)  (2.983)  (3.303)  (2.809) 
Inflation -0.520  -1.000***  -0.519 -0.773***  -0.662** 
 (0.525)  (0.245)  (0.467)  (0.263)  (0.320) 
Standard deviation of 
inflation -0.622  0.074  -0.263  -0.160  -0.416 
 (0.799)  (0.969)  (1.111)  (0.946)  (0.773) 
Exchange rate 
appreciation     0.695     
     (0.656)     
Private credit        0.003   
       (0.002)   
Sovereign rating          0.076** 
         (0.030) 
Constant 2.941***  3.825***  3.957***  3.712***  3.125*** 
 (0.907)  (0.610)  (0.560)  (0.651)  (0.712) 
Number of observations  3072  2351  2313  2351  1867 
R-squared 0.103  0.191  0.194  0.194  0.196 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. BCP Compliance and Bank Z-scores: Alternative Samples    
  excluding Japan  excluding Japan  excluding Japan  excluding Japan  excluding Japan 
  include unregulated  only commercial   only rated  
only top 10 banks 
in each country 
only top 20% 
largest banks in 
sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  logZscore logZscore logZscore logZscore logZscore 
BCP overall compliance  -0.185  -0.289  1.295*  -0.096  0.932 
  (0.325) (0.288) (0.746) (0.396) (0.654) 
Non-commercial bank  0.111  0.000  0.565**  0.164  0.701*** 
  (0.075) (0.000) (0.228) (0.193) (0.146) 
Rated  banks  0.166 0.157 0.000 0.170  0.340*** 
  (0.106) (0.123) (0.000) (0.112) (0.122) 
Net loans/total assets  0.006***  0.004***  0.004  0.004*  0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total assets  -0.061**  -0.070**  -0.077 -0.053 -0.070 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.057) (0.036) (0.081) 
Overheads/total assets  -2.879***  -3.451*** -7.219** -5.887***  -6.420*** 
  (0.578) (0.842) (3.329) (1.734) (1.699) 
Index of rule of law  0.190***  0.201***  0.079  0.118  -0.014 
  (0.057) (0.065) (0.169) (0.094) (0.130) 
GDP  growth  1.821 3.059 3.737 0.343 -2.031 
  (2.845) (3.025) (5.811) (3.332) (5.300) 
Inflation -0.946***  -1.006***  0.021  -0.170  -0.190 
  (0.248) (0.222) (0.412) (0.555) (0.464) 
Standard deviation of inflation  0.104  0.111  -1.549  -2.615**  -4.238* 
  (0.985) (0.884) (1.094) (1.216) (2.323) 
Constant  3.709***  4.032*** 3.341** 3.874*** 3.376** 
  (0.636) (0.632) (1.406) (0.801) (1.662) 
Number of observations  2962  2019  318 663 532 
R-squared  0.127 0.103 0.205 0.127 0.318 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Standard errors are clustered by country          - 21 - 
Table 4. BCP Compliance--Individual Chapters           


















 (1)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
                       
Non-commercial bank  0.548***  0.430***  0.119    0.401*  0.037  0.668*** 
 (0.124)  (0.098)  (0.079)   (0.213)  (0.210)  (0.164) 
Rated banks  0.193*  0.069  0.184*  0.172    0.183  0.307*** 
 (0.112)  (0.137)  (0.106)  (0.125)  (0.130)  (0.098) 
Net loans/total assets  0.005***  0.003  0.006***  0.004***  0.004  0.006**  0.007*** 
 (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Total assets  -0.062**  -0.022  -0.053** -0.061** -0.077  -0.031  -0.032 
 (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.028) (0.053) (0.038) (0.059) 
Overheads/total assets  -2.909**  -2.011*  -2.426*** -2.750**  -5.551**  -6.473***  -4.973** 
 (1.255)  (1.150)  (0.854)  (1.279) (2.671) (2.099) (2.112) 
Index of rule of law  0.235***  0.133*  0.199***  0.211***  0.116  0.114  0.018 
 (0.057)  (0.076)  (0.055)  (0.059) (0.260) (0.110) (0.208) 
GDP growth  2.894  6.868**  3.091  4.228  3.612  0.215  -0.254 
 (3.034)  (3.336)  (2.709)  (3.079) (5.704) (4.069) (4.723) 
Inflation -0.850**  -0.652  -1.027*** -0.939***  0.521  -0.444  -0.300 
 (0.370)  (0.438)  (0.321)  (0.337) (0.735) (0.587) (0.595) 
Standars deviation of inflation  -0.222  -0.163 0.178  -0.133  -1.910  -3.471  -5.030* 
 (1.295)  (1.412)  (1.284)  (1.181) (2.239) (2.223) (2.644) 
Index  chapter  1  0.147 0.192 0.224  0.114 0.221 0.181 0.323 
 (0.166)  (0.188)  (0.147)  (0.152) (0.278) (0.200) (0.296) 
Index chapter 2  -0.512***  -0.366**  -0.549*** -0.428*** -0.017 -0.482*** -0.034 
 (0.134)  (0.151)  (0.123)  (0.120) (0.376) (0.152) (0.289) 
Index chapter 3  0.137  0.433***  0.069  0.083  0.285  -0.066  -0.229 
 (0.152)  (0.145)  (0.149)  (0.138) (0.407) (0.174) (0.297) 
Index chapter 4  0.030  -0.365**  0.181  0.083  -0.286  0.280  0.368* 
 (0.179)  (0.144)  (0.147)  (0.157) (0.403) (0.172) (0.207) 
Index chapter 5  0.041  0.252**  0.011  0.027  0.362  -0.096  -0.038 
 (0.129)  (0.111)  (0.128)  (0.124) (0.262) (0.121) (0.206) 
Index  chapter  6  0.110**  -0.044 0.053  0.104 0.073 0.083 0.149 
 (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.048)  (0.075) (0.157) (0.071) (0.113) 
Index chapter 7  -0.129  -0.143  -0.156* -0.154*  -0.092 -0.072 -0.263 
 (0.098)  (0.113)  (0.087)  (0.089) (0.240) (0.108) (0.234) 
Constant  4.116***  2.935***  3.803*** 4.046*** 3.044* 3.787*** 2.516* 
 (0.527)  (0.757)  (0.521)  (0.588) (1.634) (0.872) (1.457) 
Number of observations  2049  2770  2611  1722  294  480  503 
R-squared  0.235 0.152 0.164  0.137 0.261 0.170 0.365 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Standard errors are clustered by country        
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Table 5. BCP Compliance and System-Wide Risk        
              
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
BCP overall compliance  0.075  0.141  0.276  0.069  0.439  0.558  -0.256 
 (0.167)  (0.315)  (0.617)  (0.159)  (0.970) (1.403) (-0.463) 
Index of rule of law  0.017  0.019  -0.008  0.024       
  (0.165)  (0.183)  (-0.076)  (0.237)     
GDP  growth  1.909***        2.023*** 2.185*** 1.573** 
  (3.651)        (3.647) (3.772) (2.508) 
Inflation    -1.582***        
    (-3.549)        
Standard deviation of inflation      -2.408**         
      (-2.012)       
Exchange rate appreciation        2.289***       
       (3.665)     
GDP per capita          -0.013     
         (-0.965)     
Private credit            -0.005**   
           (-2.205)   
Index of sovereign rating              0.055* 
           (1.890) 
Constant 1.509***  1.501*** 
1.386**
*  1.586***  1.344*** 1.395*** 1.113*** 
 (4.690)  (4.664)  (4.473)  (5.049)  (4.623) (5.348) (2.899) 
Number of observations  83  83  83  85  83 83 54 
R-squared  0.088  0.065  0.055  0.073  0.098 0.123 0.212 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   - 23 - 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Baseline sample   
  


















COSTA RICA  46 
CROATIA 44 
CZECH REPUBLIC  35 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  30 
ECUADOR 41 
EGYPT 31 
EL SALVADOR  15 
ESTONIA 12 
FRANCE 322 








































RUSSIAN FEDERATION  226 
RWANDA 5 





SOUTH AFRICA  30 
SRI LANKA  11 
SWEDEN 106 
TANZANIA 19 





UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  7 
UNITED KINGDOM  149 
URUGUAY 70 
YEMEN 7 
ZAMBIA  8 
Total (excluding Japan)  2,981 
JAPAN  721 
Total   3,702   - 25 - 
Table A. 2. Summary statistics --  Baseline sample (excluding Japan)      
            
   Mean  Median  s.d.  Maximum  Minimum 
No. of 
observations 
Bank-level variables              
z-score   2.672  2.721  1.039  6.253  -1.936  2400   
Non-commercial bank dummy  0.130  0  0.336  1  0  2981   
Rated banks dummy  0.130  0  0.337  1  0  2981   
Net loans/total assets  49.481  50.301 22.288  100  0  2950  
Total assets (logs)  19.487  19.306  2.059  27.388  13.315  2981   
Overheads/total assets  0.054  0.040  0.057  0.907  0  2981   
              
Country-level variables            
BCP compliance: Overall index  0.646  0.644  0.182  1  0.233  86   
Chapter 1  2.074  2.167  0.578  3  0.667  86   
Chapter 2  2.230  2.250  0.559  3  0.750  86   
Chapter 3  1.776  1.800  0.680  3  0.400  76   
Chapter 4  2.018  2.100  0.645  3  0.600  80   
Chapter 5  2.012  2  0.759  3  1  86   
Chapter 6  1.733  2  0.832  3  0  86   
Chapter 7  1.928  2  0.809  3  0.333  65   
Index of rule of law  -0.068  -0.287  0.859  1.813  -1.340  86   
GDP growth  0.044  0.043  0.019  0.106  0.002  86   
Inflation 0.084  0.060  0.100  0.741  -0.030  83   
Standard deviation of inflation  0.044  0.026  0.060  0.364  0.002  83   
Exchange rate depreciation  -0.054  -0.052  0.074  0.081  -0.405  85   
Private  credit  39.325  26.218 33.104  151.209  4.238  86  
Sovereign rating  10.791  10.333  4.133  20  4.200  55   
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Table A3. Cross-Correlations: Country-Level Variables           
                






















BCP overall compliance index  1               
                
                
Inflation -0.255  1             
 0.020               
                
Exchange rate appreciation  0.273  -0.725  1           
 0.012  0.000             
                
Index of rule of law  0.654  -0.275  0.265  1         
 0.000  0.012  0.014           
                
Standard deviation of inflation  -0.214  0.664  -0.361  -0.347  1       
 0.052  0.000  0.001  0.001         
                
S&P sovereign rating  0.598  -0.447  0.458  0.865  -0.463  1     
 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000       
                
Private credit  0.549  -0.355  0.342  0.770  -0.331  0.669  1   
 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.000     
                
GDP growth  -0.045  0.041  0.046  -0.099  0.124  0.036  -0.195  1 
   0.681  0.711  0.674  0.364  0.264  0.794  0.072    
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Table A4. Cross-Correlations--Bank-Level Variables       















            
Z-score   1           
            
            
Non-commercial bank 
dummy 0.120  1         
 0.000           
            
Rated banks dummy  -0.003  -0.194  1       
 0.832  0.000         
            
Net loans/total assets  0.142  0.082  0.006  1     
 0.000  0.000  0.704       
            
Total assets  0.007  0.097  0.268  0.088  1   
 0.680  0.000  0.000  0.000     
            
Overheads/total assets  -0.069 0.018  -0.006  -0.026  -0.027  1 
   0.000  0.206  0.697  0.077  0.063    
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Tables A5. Cross-Correlations: Individual BCP Chapters             
  Chapter 1  Chapter 2  Chapter 3  Chapter 4  Chapter 5  Chapter 6  Chapter 7 
            
Chapter  1  1         
            
            
Chapter  2  0.594  1       
  0.000          
            
Chapter  3  0.622  0.679  1     
  0.000  0.000        
            
Chapter  4 0.609 0.688 0.828  1       
  0.000 0.000 0.000         
            
Chapter  5 0.579 0.597 0.621 0.680  1     
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
            
Chapter  6 0.596 0.393 0.504 0.434  0.489  1   
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000     
            
Chapter  7 0.646 0.653 0.627 0.669  0.572  0.497  1 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000       - 29 - 









      
Rated banks  Includes all banks with Moody's rating  423  461 
      
Commercial banks  Includes all commercial banks  2,594  2,760 
      
Regulated banks 
Includes commercial banks, cooperative banks, 
real estate and mortgage banks, and savings 
banks 2,981  3,823 
      
All banks 
Includes regulated banks and investment 
banks/securities houses, medium and long-term 
credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, 
specialized government credit institutions  3,974  4,906 
Source:  Bankscope Database.       - 30 - 
Table A7. Variable Definitions and Sources   
Variable   Definition  Source 
        
    
z-score  Log of ((Return on equity-equity/assets)/s.d. return on equity )  Bankscope 
     
Net loans/total assets  Net loans, in percent of total assets   Bankscope 
     
LogTA  Log of total bank assets  Bankscope 
     
Overheads Overhead  costs/assets  Bankscope 
    
Index of Rule of Law  Average 1996-2002 of Index of Rule of Law    Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) 
    
Inflation  Average annual inflation rate over the previous 5 years 
World Bank, World Deveopment Indicators 
(WDI) 
     
Standard deviation of 
inflation  Standard deviation of inflation over the previous 5 years 
World Bank, World Deveopment Indicators 
(WDI) 
     
Real GDP  growth  Average annual real GDP growth over the previous 5 years 
World Bank, World Deveopment Indicators 
(WDI) 
     
Appreciation  Average annual appreciation of the nominal exchange over the previous 5 years 
World Bank, World Deveopment Indicators 
(WDI) 
     
Private credit  Ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP 
World Bank, World Deveopment Indicators 
(WDI) 
    
Index of sovereign rating  Moody's country sovereign rating  S&P's RatingDirect 
    
 